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Income-tax Department
Edited

by

Stephen G. Rusk

Whether or not the United States board of tax appeals is bound by its own
rules of practice will be a question that the United States supreme court will
have to answer.
The Schultz Bread Company filed a petition with the board October 15,
1926. On December 20, 1926 (sixty-six days after the appeal had been filed)
the commissioner moved for an extension of one hundred and twenty days
within which to answer the taxpayer’s petition. The extension was granted
by the board. The petitioner then moved to vacate the order extending the
time for filing answer and for final judgment by reason of the commissioner’s
failure to answer the petition within the time set by rule 14 of the board’s rules
of practice. The board denied the petitioner’s motion to vacate the order and
for judgment by default.
The petitioner then petitioned the District of Columbia supreme court for a
writ of mandamus ordering the board to enter judgment against the com
missioner by default and to make final determination under rule 50 of the
board’s rules of practice, and the court issued the writ asked. No comment or
opinion of the court was made upon the granting of the writ. The board has
noted an appeal and the case will go to the United States supreme court.
In the taxpayer’s mandamus action it contended that “rules of court are
binding upon both the court and the parties.” The board’s reply was that
discretion is vested in courts to suspend particular cases from the operation of
their rules, and that a court has the inherent power to suspend a rule of its own
making.
Remembering that the board will not entertain petitions of taxpayers arriv
ing one day over the sixty-day period for filing such petitions, and recalling
its solemn injunctions to taxpayers that this rule must be rigidly adhered to,
this present case is a source of amused interest to those whose petitions arrived
after four o’clock in the afternoon of the sixtieth day. It will be interesting to
learn whether or not in tax cases “sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.”
Inventories must be taken at cost or market, whichever is lower, according
to sound accounting principles and according to rules laid down by the com
missioner of internal revenue. However, in the case of Samuel Zimmern v.
D. B. Heiner, decided by the United States circuit court of appeals for the fifth
circuit, it appears that this rule was not meant to apply.
The circumstances in which this decision was made, are, briefly stated, as
follows:
Samuel Zimmern at the end of the year 1919 had goods on hand that he was
obligated to deliver on a sales contract at a price less than cost and less than the
prevailing market price of similar goods. He priced the raw material included
in his inventory at less than cost, presumably because of the sales price at
which he was obligated to deliver his product. The court held that thus valu
ing his raw material constituted an anticipation of a loss in 1919 and denied
the taxpayer’s right so to inventory.
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Without questioning the correctness of the adjudication in this case, the
decision raises some nice questions upon the subject of inventory valuations.
If an inventory is taken “at market” and subsequently the market value de
creases, is a taxpayer to be judged as having anticipated a portion of a loss he
will sustain later? Accountants will undoubtedly find this question of interest.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
A corporation in the business of purchasing and exporting iron, steel, metals
and machinery for principals in foreign countries on a commission basis was
held to be entitled to nominal-capital classification for 1917 and personal
service classification for 1918, and to a refund in the difference between the
tax paid for such years and the amount of taxes owed by the stockholders
thereof for 1918 upon their unreported distributive shares for such year, col
lection of which is barred by the statute, with interest thereon. (U. S. court of
claims, L. E. Frankel, Inc. v. United States.)
Amount recovered in 1920 on a debt ascertained to be worthless and charged
off by a corporation in 1919 is income to the corporation, where upon the sale
in 1919 of 50 per cent. of the stock of the corporation, the new stockholders
agreed that any recovery on such debt should go to the old stockholders “after
deducting any taxes on same and any back charges of government taxes that
may arise after 1918 and 1919 tax reports are reviewed by the government, ”
such provision being for the benefit of the corporation. (U. S. district court,
W. D. Washington, S. D., Nott Atwater Company v. Burns Poe, collector.)
The tax of affiliated corporations entitled to special assessment for 1918
under sec. 328, act of 1918, should be computed by applying the ratio of profits
tax to net income determined under sec. 328 to the 1918 income remaining
after deducting therefrom a net loss sustained in 1919. (U. S. court of claims,
Bell & Company and Hollings-Smith Co., affiliated corporations, v. United
States.)
The refusal of a corporation, organized in 1920 to take over a business con
ducted in that year as a partnership by the former stockholders of a corporation
which dissolved in 1919, to take over certain accounts receivable does not es
tablish the worthlessness of such accounts in 1920. (U. S. circuit court of ap
peals, fifth circuit, Charles D. Carr v. Commissioner.)
Amounts paid in 1918,1919 and 1920 by the taxpayer to his mother and aunt
for their support were held not deductible in such years as a loss, the trans
actions not being closed, where paid pursuant to two agreements, one entered
into in 1905 whereby property of the taxpayer, his mother and his aunt was
transferred to a corporation, the stock of which was held in trust by the tax
payer, who agreed to pay the living expenses of his mother and aunt, the other
entered into in 1914, whereby the mother and aunt transferred to the trustees
all their interest in the stock of the corporation and all other property which
they owned and the trustees agreed to furnish support to their mother and
aunt, such payments being for a capital asset.
Amounts paid by a stockholder to advertise corporate property are not de
ductible as a loss, such expenditures being in the nature of a capital expenditure
which might enhance the value of the taxpayer’s stock. (U. S. circuit court of
appeals, eighth circuit, Thomas H. Martin v. Commissioner.)
The elimination by the commissioner of an improper deduction on a 1917
return filed on the basis upon which its books were kept pursuant to sec. 13 (d),
act of 1917, by a corporation keeping its books on the accrual basis, does not
constitute a rejection of the “basis” upon which the return was filed, thereby
entitling the taxpayer to have its income for such year computed on the cashreceipts-and-disbursements basis, the commissioner having the authority under
the act to make any such corrections in the items as may be necessary to reflect
true income on the basis adopted. (U. S. district court, S. D., New York,
American Can Company, et al. v. Frank K. Bowers, collector.)
Income from paving contracts with a city and county, requiring the con
tractor to maintain the pavements for five years without charge, may not be
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reported as income in the last year of the maintenance period by a taxpayer
reporting on the completed-contract basis, such contracts, however, averaging
six months from start of work to receipt of contract price. (U. S. district court,
W. D. Pennsylvania, E. J. Harrison and H. R. Donnelly, receivers, v. D. B.
Heiner, collector.)
Suit against a former collector can not be maintained for the recovery of
taxes where not paid under protest and no demand for their refund had been
made upon him or the commissioner during his term, the remedy being by
action against the United States. (U. S. district court, W. D. Pennsylvania,
E. J. Harrison et al., receivers, v. C. G. Lewellyn, former collector.)
A manufacturer was allowed to recover the amount of excise taxes paid on
sales of spark coils and timers though no bond had been filed in accordance
with the appropriation act of February 28, 1927, since the appropriation pro
vided for in that act had lapsed. (U. S. court of claims, Wells Manufacturing
Company v. United States.)
Such part of the amount received by the sole stockholder from a corporation
during 1918 and 1919 in the form of a salary pursuant to a written contract as
in fact constituted a distribution of profits, is taxable to the recipient as such.
The commissioner had refused to allow the corporation to deduct the full
amount of the aforementioned payment as a salary expense.
Taxes for years 1918 and 1919 voluntarily paid during 1919 and 1920 re
spectively and without protest may be recovered in a suit pending at the time
sec. 3226, Revised Statutes, was amended to make proof of duress and protest
unnecessary. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, second circuit, Daniel Winant, et
al., executors, v. Bertram Gardner, former collector.)
Taxpayer obligated under firm sales contracts at the end of 1919 to sell its
product at a price less than cost of manufacture and less than prevailing market
price of similar merchandise may not anticipate the loss in 1919 by inventory
ing, at less than cost (inventory taken at cost), raw material suitable for the
contract but not specifically appropriated to it. (U. S. circuit court of appeals,
fifth circuit, Samuel Zimmern v. Commissioner.)
Amount of dividend paid by interest-bearing notes of a corporation should
be deducted prior to the payment of the notes in computing invested capital,
the part of the dividend so paid in notes thereafter constituting borrowed
capital. (U. S. district court, W. D. Pennsylvania, Logan-Gregg Hardware
Co. v. D. B. Heiner, collector.)
The United States is a necessary party to a suit in equity brought to cancel
a waiver of the statute of limitations on collection, executed by the complain
ant, alleged to have been obtained by fraud and duress, such waiver being for
the use and benefit of the government. (U. S. district court, Oregon, Electric
Steel Foundry v. Clyde G. Huntley et al.)
Transfer of mere legal title to farms made five days before death of decedent
in 1925, was held not to have been made in contemplation of death and there
fore not includable in gross estate for estate-tax purposes where in 1919 the dece
dent who was at that time 74 years of age but in sound health, made parol gifts of
the farms located in Kansas, to his four sons who immediately took possession,
made lasting and valuable improvements and treated the property as their
own, such parol gift being held valid and enforceable under the laws of Kansas.
The defendant’s request for supplemental findings as to the question of
estoppel on the theory that the decedent for the taxable years subsequent to
the year in which a parol gift of land had been made had taken in his incometax returns, on account of such property deductions for depreciation and state
taxes, was denied, the evidence not identifying the credits taken on such returns
introduced in evidence, and the affirmative defense of estoppel not having been
raised by the pleadings. (U. S. district court, Kansas, Fred Beeler, Jr. et al. v.
H. H. Motter, collector.)
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